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ABSTRACT
Using daily data during the period of Asian Currency Crises, this paper examines high-
frequency contagion effects among Asian six countries. By identifying the “origin” (of exchange
rate depreciation, or decline in stock prices) and the “affected” (currencies, or stock prices) in
spillover relationship, Indonesia and Korea are found to be the two main origin countries,
affecting exchange rates and stock prices of other countries. Evidence of high-frequency crisis
spillover from Thailand to other countries was weak at best.  A positive relationship between
trade link indices and the contagion coefficients is found, implying that the bilateral trade
linkage is an important factor for currency market participants to expect which currency should
be affected within days of an original a shock in the exchange rate of a particular country. 
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1. Introduction 
        The collapse of de facto dollar peg of Thai Baht on July 2, 1997 has had devastating 
financial and economic effects on most of neighboring countries in East Asia. In January 1998, 
when the crisis was in its worst state, the cumulative depreciation rate since end-June 1997 was 
about 50 percent for most of the currencies in the region. Among them, the value of the 
Indonesia Rupiah had become one-sixth of the pre-crisis level. The degree of Contagion of 
currency crises in Asia was remarkable. 
        A sudden and huge capital outflow was one of the key reasons for the Asian currency crisis, 
by causing depreciation of currencies, higher interest rates, and plummeting stock prices in 
many countries in 1997-98.1  The Asian currency crisis, as a capital account crisis, was preceded 
by the Mexican crisis, and followed by crises in Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina. However, 
contagion in terms of currency crises in regions other than Asia was limited, in its scope and its 
speed. In case of the Mexican Peso crash of 1994, several emerging stock markets in the region 
fell as investors “ran for cover”: countries like Argentina and Brazil were expected to be next in 
a series of currency crises. The support program for Argentina by IMF in March 1995 turned out 
to be successful in managing the “tequila effect”.  The global financial turmoil triggered by 
Russia’s default in 1998 increased risk premium in many emerging markets, but few countries 
suffered currency crises following Russia.2   
        What was striking in case of Asia was (1) crises in several Asian countries occurred almost 
contemporaneously in time, and (2) the most affected countries seemed to have shifted from one 
country to another. Within a few days after the Thai baht floatation in early July 1997, 
speculators attacked Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia. Hong Kong and Korea were attacked 
somewhat later on. The Asian Crisis differs from other crises in its depth and width of contagion.  
                                                  
1 See for example, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a, b), Flood and Marion (1998), Radelet and Sachs 
(1998), Yoshitomi and Ohno (1999), Ito (1997), Ito (2000), to name a few. 
2  Short-term interest rate soared from 59% as of June 1998 to 200% as of August 1998.   Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) suffered a heavy loss due to a sharp increase in bond spread of 
developing countries and requested bail out package for the Federal Reserve Bank. In order to avoid 
further default and liquidity contraction in market, FRB cut interest rates three times during September 
- November 1998. 
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        In this paper we examine high-frequency contagious effects among Asian six economies 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand) for the period of Asian 
Currency Crises.3  We use daily data to capture the day-to-day movements in the financial 
market and identify “first victim” currency (stock price), based on the methodology of the high 
frequency analysis in the finance theory.  
        We attempt to answer the following two questions: first, given a large depreciation in the 
first attacked country, to which extent the neighboring countries suffer? And second, which 
country is most likely to be affected during turbulent times?  
        Our paper is the first among papers in that the “origin” (of exchange rate depreciation, or 
decline in stock prices) and the “affected” (currencies, or stock prices) are distinguished by 
measuring the degree of depreciations.  The “origin” is assumed to be the one that suffers the 
most declines in its value. More specifically, we classify daily depreciation of each country into 
two groups: a currency that showed the largest depreciation among six currencies as the “origin” 
and others as the  “affected”.  
In consideration of the difficulty of distinguishing the origin and the affected, based on 
the time lag, because a currency crisis in one country simultaneously spills over to neighboring 
countries, we presume the simultaneous (high-frequent) contagion as the spillover effect from 
the most seriously attacked – and thereby the largest depreciated– country to others.  
        We then investigate channels through which the crisis is transmitted across countries. In 
examining the high frequency contagion, it is necessary to consider the markets’ perception 
since a piece of new information may cause a sudden shift in expectations and confidence in the 
market. Thus, we consider several factors such as news and macroeconomic fundamentals (trade 
linkage) that investors would take into account for as the crisis transmission channel.   
        In order to see whether our classification of origin and affect reflects the reality, we check 
country-specific news of the date we refer to the country as origin from Bloomberg. Then, in the 
                                                  
3 Hong Kong and Singapore are precluded from the survey because  (1) Hong Kong adopted Currency 
board system even after the onset of crisis and therefore continued to peg its currency to the US dollar, and 
(2) the depreciation of Singaporean dollar was relatively small. 
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benchmark regression, we set the origin as explanatory variable to estimate the degree of 
spillover from a country with the largest depreciation to others: we call this the contagion 
coefficient. We find evidence of high-frequency causality: a currency crisis appears to spillover 
to other currencies.4   
        The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the existing literature on 
currency crises and contagion is reviewed.  Section 3 summaries exchange rates and stock prices 
of the region during the crisis period. In section 4 the “origin” and the “affected” are defined. In 
section 5 we present empirics and in section 6 we apply time series analysis. In section 7 we 
study the relationship between high-frequency contagion and trade link channel. Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Previous Studies on Currency Crises and Contagion 
        There is a growing literature on the empirical evidence on currency crises and its 
contagious effects. We have seen at least three important currency crises in the 1990s and many 
papers have been written on these crises. Collins (1992) and Otker and Pazarbasiouglu (1997) 
investigate the 1992-93 crises in the European Monetary System. The Tequila crisis is surveyed 
in Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Ito (1997), among others. Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini (1998a, b), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Baing and Goldfajn (1999), and Berg and Pattillo 
(1999) investigate the Asian crisis.   
        What we have learned are, in general, two main interpretations of the causes of crises. 
According to one view, currency crisis reflects economic conditions in countries—structural and 
policy distortions, and weak fundamentals. As shown in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reihnart 
(1998), some macroeconomic variables show weakness during months, if not years, prior to a 
                                                  
4 Some point out the possibility of the accumulated effect: that is, an affected country falls into a more 
severe crisis than the origin country in the spillover process. If we see the Asian currency crisis as the 
accumulated effect from the initially targeted country, then the Thai baht devaluation alone should be 
interpreted as the Asian Currency Crisis. In our analysis, we do not take into account the accumulated 
effect during the course of the Asian currency crisis. We detail the contagious phenomenon from various 
points of views.       
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crisis. In these cases, it may be necessary to impose strict macroeconomic conditionality on 
these countries in order to avoid further crises. If one believes that a crisis happens due to weak 
fundamentals, crises in several countries in one region may be regarded as independent crises 
that happen to occur simultaneously. The simultaneity may be due to common global shocks, 
such as the global interest rate hike as well as sheer coincidence. 
        Another view focuses on sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence --- caused 
mainly by investors’ panic and herd behavior--- regardless of macroeconomic performance. In a 
financial market where participants share access to much of the same information, a piece of 
new information (e.g., a small attack on a currency) can provide a signal that lead to a revision of 
expectations (an information cascade) in the market. The market’s perception may be interpreted 
by currency traders in other markets as an eventual occurrence of a crisis in the near future.5  
This effect could lead to a capital outflow from the market and could result in an attack on 
currency despite of sound macroeconomic fundamentals.  In this case, countries that face 
difficulties in managing reserves and capital outflows should be rescued with financial 
assistance from the international community without any conditionality.6 If investors’ sentiment 
plays a big role, contagion may be a result of a shift in investors; view on neighboring countries 
when one country goes into a crisis.  
        In addition to these literatures, there is a lot of literature on contagion in currency crises. 
There are at least four channels through which instability in financial markets might be 
transmitted across countries.   
        First, trade links can be a channel for contagion. This channel suggests that currency crises 
will spread contagiously among countries that trade disproportionately with one another. The 
devaluation in a country boosts up its competitiveness at least temporarily, in the presence of 
nominal rigidities.  Then its trade partners are at a competitive disadvantage. Deterioration in 
                                                  
5 Agenor and Aizenman (1998) investigate currency crisis based on the imperfect credit market. 
6  The IMF's new precautionary facility Contingent Credit Lines (CCL), approved by the IMF Executive 
Board in 1999, was designed to assist countries with strong economic policies and sound financial systems 
that are seeking to resist contagion from disturbances in global capital markets. 
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terms of trade will also worsen their economic performances in the mid- and long- run. Those 
most-adversely-affected countries are likely to be attacked next.  Glick and Rose (1998) find the 
correlation between the spread of crisis and trade links. 
        Second, a channel through common creditors may explain spillovers of a crisis. The 
common creditor hypothesis is based on the lending institutions’ tendency to ensure the 
immediate liquidity. When financial institutions face a default in one country, they tend to 
withdraw capitals not only from the country but also from other countries so that they will avoid 
further decline in their asset values. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) provide related analysis.     
        Third, sudden changes in assessment of emerging market countries among investors and 
lending agencies may cause the contagion. The Wake-up call hypothesis states that investors 
change the risk assessment to other countries in the wake of one crisis and become pessimistic 
toward investment or even rush the recovery of credit. Macroeconomic or financial similarities 
are often trigger re-assessment. A crisis may spread from the initial crisis country to another if 
the other has similar economic conditions, such as the Current Account to GDP ratio, the 
Foreign Reserves to short-term borrowings ratio, and so on. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) 
put on contagion in this light.7 
         
        It should also be noted that the concept of “contagion” varies from author to author.  
   For one case, we can think of a currency crisis as being contagious if it spreads from 
the initial crisis country to another. 8  Masson (1999a) argues based on multiple 
equilibria model that crisis contagion can be referred as an equilibrium switch under 
some economic fundamental conditions.9 The alternative view is that the contagion 
                                                  
7 Literature based on Macroeconomic fundamentals, see Collins (1992), Flood and Marion (1994), 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994, 1996), Otker and Pazarbasioglu (1997), to name a few.  Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) is an excellent survey on empirical literatures.  Berg and Pattillo (1999) 
argue the crises predictability. 
8 Masson (1999 b) classifies the causes of currency crisis into three: (１) common cause (monsoon effect), 
(2) fundamentals (spillover effect), and (3) trigger of first and hard hit country (sentiment jump).  
9 Flood and Marion (2000) focus currency crisis based on models of multiple equilibria.  Jeanne and 
Masson (2000) apply the Markov Switching model. Obstfeld (1996) incorporates unemployment rate to 
the multiple equilibria model. 
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effect is thought of as an increase in the probability of a speculative attack on the 
domestic currency. See Eichengree, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), for example, for this 
view. 
        As is well known, it is difficult to distinguish empirically between common shocks and 
contagion, especially in the middle of crisis. In both explanations above, the actual occurrence 
(or an increase in probability) of crises depends on the existence of a (not necessarily successful) 
speculative attack elsewhere in the world. 
        In this paper, we measure the contagion coefficient as the ratio of depreciation of currency (or a 
decline in stock prices) of one country to that of the initial crisis country. In order to see if large 
movements of exchange rates are caused by the common shocks that simultaneously affected several 
countries or a crisis and its contagion in the region, we check the news release relevant to the date of 
large depreciation from Bloomberg. We find that Asian exchange rate movements during the crisis 
period were highly sensitive to crisis-related statements, such as the financial systems, bankruptcies, 
and political instability of a country where the currency depreciated most.      
        Our objective in this paper advances these viewpoints to analyze intra-day spillover effect 
from the first affected country, namely the high frequency contagion.  We do not judge why the 
original crisis happened either by bad fundamentals (first generation model) or by a 
self-fulfilling attack (second generation model). Instead, the size of contagious effect from 
“ground zero” to other countries is measured, given the incidence of the initial attack. To 
anticipate a result, it is found that a high-frequency contagion phenomenon can be explained by 
the trade linkage within Asia. See, Glick and Rose (1999) and Eichengreen, Wyploz and Rose 
(1996). 
        One of the most significant weaknesses of earlier literatures on contagion is the absence of 
distinguishing the origin and affected in causality relationship. In the financial market, investors 
are likely to respond to an attack by withdrawing capital not only from the first attacked country, 
but also from neighboring countries within a few days, if not hours.  In this respect, using 
monthly or quarterly data, even weekly data, on which many previous analyses based, may limit 
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analytical capability of crisis correlations among countries during a crisis period. 
        Our measure of contagion permits us to identify systemically important countries. Namely, 
whose contagion effects are significant and sizable can be found.   
 
 
3. Exchange Rate and Stock Price during the crisis period 
        The daily data of the nominal exchange rate (vis-a-vis US dollar) and stock prices of 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand are used. 10  The sample period 
begins at January 3, 1997 for the exchange rate and January 3, 1994 for stock prices and ends at 
July 7, 1999 for both series. Both the exchange rate and stock prices data are obtained from 
Datastream. 
Figure 1-1（exchange rate, June 30 1997=100） 
        Figure 1-1 shows the exchange rates of six currencies against US dollar from June 
30, 1997 to July 7, 1999. They are normalized at 100 on June 30, 1997. The behavior of 
exchange rates through the crisis period varied considerably across the countries. In 
Thailand, after an initial sharp depreciation due to the floatation of the baht on July 2, 
1997, there were a series of smaller, but still substantial depreciation over a prolonged 
period, culminating in 17 percent depreciations by the end of August. The pressures 
were eased in September in response to measures to prevent further depreciation. We 
can see that a large depreciation in Thai baht initially had a substantial impact on 
Philippines peso and Indonesia rupiah.  
        In contrast, Indonesia’s exchange rate depreciated fairly steadily starting in July 1997. 
Pressure on the Indonesia rupiah was intensified in late September due to increased problems in 
the financial market, but complicated by the political sector. With the rupiah falling further 
against the U.S. dollar by early October, IMF-supported programs for Indonesia were 
                                                  
10 Stock price indices are: Jakarta Composite Index (ID), Korea South Composite Index (KR), Composite 
Index (ML), Composite Index (PH), Weighted Index (TW), Bangkok Book Club (TH). 
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announced on October 31, 1997. Then, Indonesia rupiah recovered temporarily in response to 
the program.11 The limited recovery in the next few weeks was reversed by large further 
depreciation starting in late 1997 to mid 1998.  
        Korea avoided substantial depreciation until October 1997, with the exchange rate 
remaining broadly stable in July-October 1997. However, as Korean banks began to face 
difficulties in rolling over their short-term foreign liabilities, the exchange rate fell precipitously 
during late November- end December 1997.  
Figure 1-2, stock prices 
        Figure 1-2 plots stock price indices of 6 countries from January 3, 1994 to July 7, 1999, 
with January 3, 1994=100.  It is obvious from this figure that the stock market paints a different 
picture from the exchange rate market. Stock prices of Thailand peaked in 1994. On the other 
hand, stock prices of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan continued to increase or had been 
stable until late 1996.   
        Stock prices of Korea, Malaysia and Philippines began to fall in December 1996. In 
Indonesia, stock prices even increased through mid-1997, but fell sharply in the aftermath of the 
Thai crisis. Stock prices of Taiwan also fell by some extent, but its level in mid 1997 still 
exceeded the 1994 price level. In October 1997, stock prices of Korea and Malaysia dropped 
significantly.12 The declines in stock prices continued until September 1998, then headed for 
recovery except Thailand and Malaysia.  
 
4. Definitions of “origin” and “affected” 
        In the midst of the crises, many currencies depreciated at the same time. For instance, a 
large depreciation of the Thai baht seemed to have made a substantial impact on Philippines peso 
                                                  
11  On November 5, 1997, the IMF’s Executive Board and Indonesia approved a three-year Stand-By 
Arrangement equivalent to $10 billion. Additional financing commitments included $8 billion form the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and pledges from interested countries amounting to some 
$18 billion as a second line of defense. 
12 In October 1997, Hong Kong dollar was targeted of speculative attack and the Currency Board system 
raised interest rate that resulted in a decline in stock prices. So, several measures to shore up the stock 
market, including public funds injection, were taken. 
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and Indonesia rupiah and then it made a feedback to the Thai baht. In order to analyze 
statistically the size and the direction of spillover effect, we differentiate the “ground zero 
(origin)” from the “affected” countries. 
        In order to sharpen our analysis, we use the daily data. The problem of using a low 
frequency data (semi-annual, quarterly, and monthly), on which many previous literature are 
based, is that it smoothes out a lot of shorter duration interactions between the markets. Low 
frequency data makes it difficult to capture small but important events in the sample period.  The 
feedback movements explained above would be grossed over by the use of monthly or quarterly 
data.    
        We first construct an indicator that distinguishes the “origin” from others that are referred 
to as “affected”. To sketch the idea briefly, we first show the weekly (Friday to Friday) origin. It 
is calculated based on the weekly change in the exchange rate. Weekly origin of a crisis is a 
currency that depreciated most in the week with its depreciation exceeding 4%. This cut off 
number is ad hoc.   
        Table1-1 plots weekly origin of exchange rate depreciation, from July 1997 to January 
1998.  
Table 1-1, weekly origin 
        One problem using weekly change as origin is that weekly origin depends on the choice of 
the day of the week. Think of a currency that depreciates 3 percent from Thursday to Friday and 
then again 2 percent from Friday to Monday. Using the definition of 4-percent-cut-off 
depreciation starting on Friday does not pick this currency as origin; while, Monday-to-Monday 
origin does.  
 
        Now, a new way of defining origin is developed.  
        First, daily percentage change of the exchange rate (stock price) is written as: 
 
                    DR(t,j) = R(t, j) - R(t-1, j), 
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where R(t,j) is log of nominal exchange rate (country j) with respect to the US dollar at date t.  
We next compute the weighted cumulative change, DRR(t,j), as the weighted cumulative change 
with the declining weights of past DRs 13: 
 
                    DRR(t,j) = 0.5DR(t,j)+0.25DR(t-1,j)+0.125DR(t-2,j) 
                                                       +0.0625DR(t-3,j)+0.0625DR(t-4,j). 
 
    The rationale for our measurement of origin based on DRR, not on DR, is as follow. It is 
often observed that a large depreciation (decline in stock price) followed by a large recovery in 
order to correct the overshooting.  For example, both currency A and B were heavily hit to 
depreciate 11 and 10 percent respectively. Next day, currency A showed a recovery of 8 percent, 
while currency B did only 2 percent. It would be appropriate to interpret that currency B was 
more severely targeted. DR-based-origin, however, counts A as ground zero. We are likely to 
misjudge the severity of crisis should we see only the daily percentage change of depreciation. 
Using DRR, country B will be identified as a crisis country. 
        Our declining weight formula is also intended to avoid lingering effects of large changes of 
days ago. A crisis is not judged as severe when the rate of depreciation (decline in stock price) is 
large, but one-time-only. If we assume the equal weights, then, a very large depreciation of 5 
days ago would influence the selection of the current origin of a crisis.  
 
        Our “origin” measure, DOR, is defined as follows: 
   DOR(t,0) = largest DRR at each t and also whose depreciation rate exceeds 2%.14     
 
                                                  
13 The weights are arbitrarily chosen.  The optimal weight (coefficient) may be computed from running 
VAR, but this method would not be plausible for East Asian countries since they pegged their currencies 
to US dollar prior to 1997.   
14 The threshold of 2% is arbitral. 
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        Table1-2 and Table 1-3 summarize the DOR(t,0) of exchange rates and stock prices, 
respectively. 
Table 1-2; Daily origin of exchange rate, Table 1-3; daily origin of Stock price 
        Table 1-2 lists the origins determined by DOR for the exchange rate depreciation from July 
1997 to July 1999. The table makes it possible to pin down the crisis date in each country. For 
instance, July 1997 for Thailand, August-September 1997 for Indonesia, October 1997- January 
1998 for Korea, and after January 1998 for Indonesia. With the economy back on the growth 
path in most of Asian countries after April 1999, the number of plots of origin declined. Our 
measure of origin is consistent with academic references as to the beginning of the crisis period: 
number of different measures gives a starting date of July 1997 for Thailand, August 1997 for 
Indonesia, and November 1997 for Korea. 
        Table 1-3 plots the origin of stock price declines. The stock price in the region was at its 
peak in early 1990s and then went downward by 1997 in most of countries. Since late 1994, 
stock prices began to fall in Thailand and fell by almost one third. The decline continued in 
Thailand in early 1997. In Indonesia, stock prices increased through mid-1997, but fell 
dramatically in the aftermath of the Thai crisis. In Korea, the decline of stock prices was 
temporarily interrupted in the first half of 1997 but continued in the second half in the wake of 
the banking sector crisis.  As the contagion of exchange rate depreciation spread in the region, 
the downward pressure of stock prices was further intensified in Malaysia, Korea, and Indonesia. 
Since July 1998, stock price decline originated mainly from Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. 
The rate of decline and the frequency of large decline have been moderated since December 
1998. The tremors in the stock market occurred even before the currency crisis and lingered on 
long after the currency started to strengthen. 
        In wake of financial crisis, market sentiment tends to be more volatile in general. Investors 
become more sensitive to bad news announcements and events. The news works as a signal to 
investors. A publicly available signal provides investors common information that may induce 
them to behave uniformly. The so-called herd behavior may result.    
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        Table 2 lists news release, relevant to the timing and date of exchange rate origin in Table 
1-2, collected from Bloomberg. Before the July 1997 crisis, exchange rates in most of the East 
Asian countries did not respond to news because of the de facto peg to the US dollar. Therefore 
we check if the behavior of exchange rate began to reflect the news release after the floatation.     
Table2, exchange rate, daily origin-News 
        For early stage of crisis, news was relatively straightforward and was categorized to 
crisis-related statement; such as authorities’ announcement on exchange rate regime, foreign 
reserves and IMF support package. In late 1997 and early 1998, news relevant to large 
movements of the exchange rates became related to the vulnerability of financial and economic 
systems, bankruptcies, and political instability. A case can be seen that concerns on the banking 
system in Korea intensified the devaluation pressure at this stage. It is also argued that exchange 
rate movement was highly sensitive to news related to political instability in Indonesia.   
 
5. Matrices of Cumulative Contagion 
        In order to make the idea of high-frequency contagion more concrete, a new measure of 
crisis spillover is proposed, namely the contagion coefficient. This is the ratio of depreciation 
rate of origin to that of affected country. This contagion coefficient measures high-frequent 
spreading of financial crisis from the origin (first attacked country) to other affected countries.  
        The contagion coefficient is defined as: 
 
    CC(t,i)= DRR(t,i)／ DOR(t,0)， 
 
where i≠0.  Table 3-1 reports CC(t,i) for exchange rate and Table 3-2 to Table 3-4 report CC(t,i) 
for stock price. Sample period starts on July 1 1997 and ends on July 7 1999.15 
                                                  
15 The sample period includes when Malaysia began to peg its currency to US dollar starting at September 
1, 1998.  The daily percentage change in exchange rate is close to zero and so is the DRR in Malaysia after 
September 1998.  Therefore, Malaysia is virtually excluded from “origin” for this period. Thus, we do not 
need to explicitly impose structural change of Malaysia on regression models in the following section.  
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        A negative sign of CC indicates the opposite movements of exchange rate (stock price) between 
origin and affected countries: in the case of exchange rate, a devaluation of the origin country leads to 
an appreciation of affected countries. On the other hand, a positive sign of CC indicates that the 
direction of exchange rate (stock price) movements between the origin country and affected countries 
are the same.  That is, a devaluation of origin country leads to a devaluation of affected countries: 
namely contagion.  
        “t-stat (t-statistics)” in Table 3-1-Table 3-4 is the significance for testing the null hypothesis 
of CC equals zero.16 The null hypothesis implies there exists no significant high-frequency 
contagion from origin to affected.  
Table3-1 plot of CC (exchange rate), Figure 2-1 
        Table 3-1 shows CC(t,i) for the exchange rate. As shown in Table 1-2, the frequency of 
crisis (the origin) drastically decreases after June 1998, implying that exchange rates had 
become stabilized or back on a recovery track by the summer 1998. Most of crisis (large 
depreciation) after July 1998 were from Indonesia. Therefore, we divide the sample period into 
four in the case of Indonesia. Specifically, for origin of Indonesia, we calculate CC(t,i) for the 
two sub-sample periods, crisis period (1997/7/1-12/31, 1998/1/1-6/30) and recovery period 
(1998/7/1-1999/7/7), in addition to the worst-state period (1997/10/1-1997/12/31).  
        In the case of exchange rates, there are 87 instances that are regarded as the crisis origin in 
terms of our definition. Of those, 60 instances are of Indonesia, 14 instances of Korea, and 7 
instances of Thailand, and 6 others.   
        The significance of estimated coefficients varies according to sample periods and countries. 
The contagion coefficients originating from Thailand and from Philippines are, in many cases, 
negative. Shortly after the onset of currency crisis, two hard-hit currencies, the Thai baht and 
Philippines peso, continued the devaluation while other currencies were not severely affected 
and remained their value to US dollar. Thus, the contagion coefficients from these countries to 
                                                  
16 Calculation is as follows: Stat = (x^-x0)/(square root of variance / square root of NOB), where 
x^:average; x0:(Null)=0 and x0 is the ratio of DOR/DRR (CC). 
 15
others are not significantly different from zero.  
        The sign of coefficients of affected countries, when the origin is either Indonesia or Korea, 
is positive and significantly different from zero. That is, the large depreciation of Indonesian and 
Korean currencies tended to induce simultaneous depreciation in other currencies. That is, we 
find evidence of significant high-frequency contagion originating from Indonesia to Malaysia, 
Indonesia to Thailand, Korea to Malaysia, Korea to Thailand, and Korea to Indonesia.  
        Our high-frequency data shows that the contagion coefficients of Indonesia as the origin 
are positive and significant for all but Korea over the period from July to December 1997. Also, 
the Korean won as an origin does no t affect the Indonesian Rupiah. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that the depreciation of Indonesian Rupiah won contagiously spilled over to Korean 
won and vice versa, the finding provides evidence that the collapse of Indonesian rupiah did not 
cause the depreciation of Korean won. As shown in Table 2 (news release), exchange rate 
movement was highly sensitive to news related to political instability in Indonesia: the concerns 
on the political instability intensified the devaluation pressure. The effect of Rupiah depreciation, 
or political instability, affected neighboring countries, but not Korea. After June 17, 1998, the 
result is reversed: the contagion coefficient of Indonesia is significantly positive only in Korea 
and insignificantly different from zero or significantly negative in other countries. 
       Figure 2-1 shows the significance of exchange rate contagion coefficient graphically. As 
seen from the figure, depreciation of Indonesia and Korea has high-frequency contagion effects 
on currencies in the region, while we do not find evidence of significant spillover effect from 
Thailand to other countries. 
 
Table 3-2～3-4, plot of CC (stock price), Figure 2-2,  Figure 2-3 
        Table 3-2 - Table 3-4 presents CC(t,i) of stock prices. Table3-2 shows CC for whole sample 
period and Table3-3 and Table3-4 present results for pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, 
respectively. The instances as origin as a whole dramatically increase for post-crisis, but the 
situation depends on pairs of countries.  Figure 2-2 and 2-3 show the significance of stock price 
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contagion coefficient before and after the crisis, respectively. 
        For Indonesia, there are 2 instances as the origin for the pre-crisis period, and 28 instances 
for the post-crisis period. For Korea, 3 instances for the pre-crisis and 44 for the post-crisis; for 
Malaysia, 4 for the pre-crisis and 25 for the post-crisis. For these 3 countries, the number of 
instances regarded as origin dramatically increased after the onset of crisis.    
        On the other hand, for the Philippines and Thailand, the number of instances before and 
after the crisis does not show marked difference. For the Philippines, there are 12 instances for 
the pre-crisis period and 15 instances for the post-crisis period. For Thailand, 17 for the 
pre-crisis and 16 for the post-crisis.  In contrast to other countries, Taiwan is the only country 
whose instances as origin surprisingly decreased from 16 for the pre-crisis period to 6 for the 
post-crisis period.   
       The contagion coefficients of ASEAN countries as the origin for the post-crisis period turn 
to be significantly positive, and the magnitude of contagion coefficients become larger. A case 
for Korea as the origin, the contagion coefficients for the pre-crisis period are negative, while 
they become positive and significantly different from zero for the post-crisis period.    
        In sum, high frequency contagion of stock prices has been intensified with some exceptions 
in Taiwan, after the currency crisis occurred in Thailand in July 1997.  
 
6. Regression Results 
6.1. Exchange Rates 
        In the previous section we find high-frequency contagion in both exchange rates and stock 
prices among the Asian countries. The stock price high-frequency contagion becomes 
intensified after the crisis.  
        In this section, we present some formal econometric results to show statistically to what 
extent the depreciation of exchange rate (decline of stock prices) of first attacked country, 
namely origin, affects others.   
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        The Dynamic OLS (DOLS) method with the following specification is used:17  
 
      affected(t,i) = const + a1*origin(t, 0) 
                                      +b1*dorigin(t+1, 0) + b2*dorigin(t, 0) +b3*dorigin(t-1, 0) + e, 
 
where i≠0. Here, affect(t,i) is DRR and origin(t,0) is DOR defined in section 4 above, and 
dorigin(t,0) = DOR(t,0)-DOR(t-1,0).  
        The Dynamic OLS method provides efficient estimator if the regressor is cointegrated or 
endogenous.  By including the current change as well as the past and future changes of the 
regressor in the regression, we are able to maintain the strict exogeneity of the regressor, the 
origin (DOR). The order of leads and lags of changes of regressor, dorigin, is arbitrary: we set 
the order of both leads and lags being equal to 1 in the analysis below.  Standard errors for a 
point estimate of a1 is recalculated based on the DOLS residuals and then adjusted to the sample 
period of recalculated the augmented cointegrating regression.18    
        For purposes of comparison, 2 types of estimation are conducted. (1) The regressor, 
origin(t,j), includes all instances of being the “origin”. That is, we do not distinguish the first 
crisis “country”. We call this regressor “pooled origin”.  And (2) country specific origin(t,j). 
That is, a regression is conducted on origin according to the country. We call this 
“country-specific origin”.   
        The expected sign of a point estimate of a1 is positive if there exists high-frequency 
contagion.  Estimation results are summarized in Table 4-1. 
Table4-1 DOLS exchange rate 
        Table 4-1 shows the estimation results for exchange rate for the period from July 1 1997 to 
July 7 1999. The first row of the table shows the regression results estimated with the pooled 
                                                  
17 We do not include the interest rate differentials in the estimation. For the very short period of time, 
especially in the phase of crisis, investors do not take account of interest rate parity, but only nominal price 
(exchange rate, stock price). Thus, interest rate differentials are expected to be insignificant.  
18 See Hayashi (2000) for details. 
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origin. The second and the third rows of the table show the estimation results with 
country-specific origins, Indonesia and Korea, respectively.19 
        Estimation results show that estimated coefficients a1 in Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand with the pooled origin are positive and significantly different from zero. The sign of 
estimated coefficient is, however, negative in Indonesia. The result for Indonesia can be 
interpreted as that the Indonesian rupiah behaved differently from others, namely no contagion 
in general. For example, most of the currencies in East Asia are back on recovery track around 
April 1998, while Indonesia rupiah continued to decline.   
        Estimated coefficients in Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand are significantly 
different from zero and the point estimates range from 0.12 to 0.19. In contrast, the estimated 
coefficient is not significant in Taiwan: that is, Taiwan did not suffer the high-frequency 
contagion of crisis from the first-hit country. This finding is consistent with the fact that Taiwan 
is one of the least hit countries in 1997.  
        Next, estimation results on country-specific origin are examined. A case of Indonesia as 
origin, contagion coefficients in Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand are positive and 
significantly different from zero. In contrast, contagion coefficient in Korea is significantly 
negative. Indonesia rupiah severely depreciated following the Korea won in early 1998. The 
movement of Korean won was opposite to that of Indonesia: when Indonesia was hard hit, 
Korean won was on the recovery track. Therefore, the coefficient of Korea on rupiah is likely to 
be negative.   
        There seems a significant high frequency contagion in Indonesia and Malaysia in case of 
Korea as the origin. The estimated coefficient in Indonesia is 0.68 and significantly different 
from zero. The estimated coefficient in Philippines is 0.24 but insignificant, and in Thailand, 
significantly negative.  
        Two important findings emerge from the estimation results. First, there exists 
                                                  
19  DOLS regressions include leads and lags in both OLS and residual regressions and therefore, reduce 
degree of freedom. Thus, Thai origin is precluded from the regression.  
 19
high-frequency contagion among East Asian countries.  Our contagion coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant in most country pairs of the origin and the affected. Second, 
contagion effects originating from Indonesia and from Korea are significant in many countries.20 
 
6.2. Stock Prices 
Table 5-1 to Table 5-7 presents the estimation results for stock prices. We run 
regressions for three sample periods: whole sample period (January 1994-July 1999), pre-crisis 
(January 1994-June 1997), and post-crisis period (July 1997-July 1999). Due to the degree of 
freedom problem, regressions for the pre-crisis period for Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia as the 
origin are excluded. The regression estimates on Taiwan as the origin is not shown for the 
post-crisis period for the same reason. 
 Table5-1～Table5-7   Stock Price  DOLS 
        Regression results of contagion coefficients estimated on pooled origin are shown in Table 
5-1. Contagion effects are significant with positive coefficients in all countries for the whole 
sample period. The estimated coefficient is significantly negative in Korea for both pre- and 
post- crisis periods. However, the magnitude of coefficient becomes smaller for post crisis 
period. In contrast to the results that showed the intensified contagious effects for post crisis 
period in most countries, the magnitude of estimated coefficient in Taiwan declined sharply after 
the crisis. Taiwan was less influenced from high-frequency stock price contagion after the crisis.  
        Table 5-2 to 5-7 presents regression results estimated with the country-specific origin. 
        Table5-2 shows the results with the Indonesia origin. The estimated coefficients are 
significantly positive in both Malaysia and the Philippines.   
        Table5-3 is the case of Korea as the origin. All estimated coefficients, except Thailand, are 
significantly negative. The magnitude of estimated coefficients for the post-crisis period 
becomes larger (in negative) in Indonesia and Malaysia.  These are consistent with the fact that 
                                                  
20  Baig and Goldfajin (1999), for instance, use VAR to analyze impulse response among Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and conclude that the impulse shock of Indonesia has significant 
effect on other countries. Our findings are consistent with these results. 
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Korean stock price index declined sharply in late 1997 while stock prices in other countries 
remained stable.  
        Table5-4 reports the estimation results on Malaysia as the origin. Most of the estimates are 
significantly negative, but positive and significant only in Thailand. 
        The results of Philippines as the origin are summarized in Table 5-5. The estimated 
coefficients in Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia are significantly positive for both pre- and post- 
crisis periods.  The sign of coefficients turn to be positive (but insignificant) in Thailand for the 
post-crisis period.  
        Table5-6 presents the results of Taiwan as the origin. The coefficients are all significant. 
        The estimation results of Thailand as the origin are shown in Table 5-7. The sign of 
coefficients turn to be positive (insignificant) in Indonesia and negative in Taiwan (significant) 
and in Malaysia (insignificant), after the crisis.  
         In sum, the regression results estimated on the pooled origin and on the country-specific 
origin do not show marked differences. The sign and significance of estimated coefficients vary 
from country to country depending on origin by individual countries. The estimation results with 
the pooled origin, however, clearly show the existence of high-frequency contagion in the stock 
market, especially after the crisis. This finding is consistent with a view that the change in the 
exchange rate regimes among the Asian countries influenced the relationship between capital 
markets performances, and investors started to treat the region as a whole.21 
 
7. Contagion and Trade Link Channel 
        In this section we explore for possible channels of high-frequency contagion. Why crises 
spread and why they tend to be regional are, as briefly mentioned in Section 2, explained in the 
literature by macroeconomic similarities, the existence of common creditor, and a trade linkage.  
        In financial market, investors pull their capital out of countries in the same region of the 
                                                  
21 Malliaropulos (1998), for example, reports negative relationship between the return of stock prices and 
the change in exchange rates. 
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first-hit country. Investors’ perception of which countries will be affected next depends on 
several factors including macroeconomic fundamentals and financial vulnerability. From the 
perspective of most empirical crisis models, however, it is hard to understand why crises tend to 
spread in the same region, at least at an early stage of crisis. As shown in Glick and Rose (1999), 
performances of macroeconomic fundamentals are not necessarily similar among crises 
countries.     
        Another transmission channel, the Common Creditor hypothesis, emphasize the role of 
bank lending. Lenders tend to withdraw capital not only from the first-hit country but also from 
others in order to avoid further losses. Figure 3-1 reports the bank liabilities in Asian six 
countries at the end of June 1997.22  The figure reveals that the Asian countries, most notably 
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, relied on international bank credit. The common creditor 
hypothesis can be examined whether capital withdrawal by financial institutions, whose loan 
ratio to these countries are as high as that in the first-hit country, will induce depreciation. The 
common creditor index is calculated as  
               CCI(i,0,k) ≡ Li0*Lik  
The loan ratio, Li0 (Lik), is the bank lending from country i (Japan, US, Europe) to country 0 (or k) 
(Asia, and 0≠k) divided by the total loan lending to the world from country i. For example, Li0 is the 
ratio of Japan’s lending to Thailand (i=Japan and 0=Thailand) to Japan’s total lending to the world. 
The loan ratio Lik is the ratio of Japan’s lending to Malaysia. (i=Japan and k=Malaysia). The common 
creditor hypothesis states that the higher the loan ratio to the origin and other countries, the larger the 
withdrawal of capital from other countries. According to the hypothesis, a positive relationship 
between the common creditor index, CCI(i,0,k) and contagion coefficient CC(i,k).  
        Figure 3-2 plots the contagion coefficients (CC) and the Common creditor index (CCI). The 
CC is measured on the vertical axis and the CCI is measured on the horizontal axis. The 
devaluation spillover from Thailand to Indonesia, from Korea to Thailand and to Indonesia, and, 
                                                  
22 Bank for International Settlement (BIS), Consolidated International Claims of Reporting Banks on 
Individual Countries, by Nationality of Reporting Banks, BIS Quarterly Review, June 2002. 
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from Indonesia to Thailand, seems to be supported by the existence of common creditors. For 
other pairs, however, it is difficult to find a strong relationship between common creditor index 
and contagion. The correlation coefficient, in total, is –0.14. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret 
the results as a supportive evidence for the Common Creditor hypothesis. 
Figure 3-1, 3-2 
        Depreciation of the first-hit country gains price competitiveness at least in the short run. 
Then, countries that have trading relationship with this country lose competitiveness. They are 
therefore more likely to allow depreciation to maintain competitiveness. 
        In practice, it takes some time until current trade balance deterioration will be reflected in 
GDP and other economic data so that depreciation is justified by fundamentals. However, 
investors predict the future depreciations of trading partners at the onset of a currency crisis in 
one country. Investors are likely to sell currencies of trading partners in anticipation of 
depreciation in the near future, so that depreciation happens even before the actual trading 
channel runs its course. Hence, theory predicts a slow process, but expectation moves events 
faster. That is, investors based on expectation of deterioration of trading balances of the 
neighboring economies in the future sells the currency immediately, resulting in high frequency 
contagion. This is the trade link channel through which the devaluation (or depreciation) of the 
first-hit currency contemporaneously spills over to other currencies in the region. 
        For many Asian countries, a large portion of their goods is exported to the United States, 
Japan, EU, and Intra Asia.23  It is tempting to believe that some direct and indirect trade linkages 
due to bilateral and third-market competition were instrumental in repeated rounds of 
competitive devaluation. There is a large volume of studies on contagion and trade link 
(Eichengreen and Rose (1999), Glick and Rose (1999), Forbes (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000) to name a few), and they support the evidence of relationship between the contagion and 
trade links. 
        In the following, we investigate evidence of the relationship between the high-frequency 
                                                  
23 Export share within Asia varies between countries and ranges from 25% to 45%. 
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contagion and trade link channel using three measures; competitive effect, income effect, and 
cheap import effect. 
 
7.1 Competitive Effect 
        There are three different types of explanations why contagion spreads via the trade channel 
in geographic proximity. The first explanation relies on the competitive effect analyzed by 
Gerlach and Smets (1995), and Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000). Devaluation of a 
first-hit country makes export prices of its trading competitors relatively more expensive. Then, 
market participants may expect declining trade balance in competitors due to weakened price 
competitiveness, and are likely to withdraw capital out of these countries.  
        For analysis, we provide two indices, export share and Direct Trade Linkage Index (DTLI).  
Table６ 
        Table 6 presents the export share in intra-Asia trade for each of 5 countries (Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) for 1996-1999.24  The export share of country m is 
the ratio of export from country m to country n divided by the total export of country m. The 
relationship between contagion coefficient (CC) and the export share is expected to be positive. 
If the export share of the origin to affected countries is large, the price competitiveness of the 
origin affects those countries adversely. As a result, affected countries are more likely to suffer 
the crisis contagion from the first-hit country. 
        In order to look at the competitive effect more carefully, we employ another index, Direct 
Trade Linkage Index (DTLI), similar to that used in Glick and Rose (1999).25 
 
          DTLI 0i = 1- (xi0 - x0i) / (xi0 + x0i). 
 
                                                  
24 IMF, Direction of Trade (2000). 
25 Although this index is similar to that in Glick and Rose (1999), the calculation is different from theirs. 
They focus on the absolute difference of export share between countries 0 and i, while our calculation 
incorporates the difference of export and import size, and direction of trade between the two countries.  
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        Here, xmn denotes bilateral exports from country m to n.  Subscript o and i indicate home 
country and its direction of trade, respectively. Thus, x0i measures exports from home country to 
other country i, while xi0 can be interpreted as imports of home country from other country. Then, 
(xi0 - x0i) denotes the net import of home country from country i, and (xi0 + x0i) denotes the 
aggregate trade of home country.  
        The index DTLI 0i is higher than 1 if exports from country o to country i is greater than 
imports of o from i. The index lies between 0 and 1 if imports exceed exports. The index is close 
to 1 if the bilateral trade between countries o and i are almost equal.  
        For example, when the bilateral trade balance from countries o to i is positive, then the 
depreciation (or devaluation) of country o accelerates the export of country o and, in contrast, 
depresses the export of country i to country o. Then, country i may suffer the disadvantage of 
price competition. Thus, contagion coefficient (CC) is expected to be positively related to DTLI 
0i for DTLI 0i >1. On the other hand, when exports from country i to country o exceeds imports of 
country i from country o, for DTLI 0i <1, it is assumed that the price disadvantage of country i 
resulting from the depreciation of country o is less severe. So, CC may be small and/or negative. 
Therefore, the positive correlation coefficient between DTLI and CC is expected as a whole. The 
expected relationship between DTLI and CC is summarized below.  
 
                          country 0 (origin)           country i           country i : price                   CC 
                                                                                           competitiveness 
  DTLI 0i  >1        export surplus         excess of import          great loss                     positive 
  DTLI 0i ≈ 1             balance                      balance          small loss-no change         positive 
  DTLI 0i  <1        excess of import       export surplus             no change            small or negative 
   
Table 7        Figure 3-3,  Figure 3-4 
        Table 7 summarizes DTLI0i. Figure 3-3 plots the contagion coefficients (CC) and the export 
share, and figure 3-4 plots the CC and DTLI 0i.  The CCs are measured on the vertical axis in both 
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figures. The export share and DTLI are measured on the horizontal axis in figure 3-3 and figure 
3-4, respectively.  
       As shown in figure 3-3 and figure 3-4, there exists a positive relationship between CC and 
export share, and between CC and DTLI. The correlation coefficient of each figure is 0.329 and 
0.258, respectively. 
   
7.2 Income Effect 
        The second measure to relate the trade links to crisis contagion is the income effect.26  
Imports of crisis country decline due to the downturn of economic activities and therefore the 
income level decreases. Then, its trading partners also suffer negative macroeconomic effects 
because of reduction in exports to the first-hit country. Countries with large export share to the 
first-hit country suffer from a negative income effect of the crisis country and, therefore, are 
likely to experience depreciation as well.   
Table8   Figure 3-5 
        Table8 reports the income effect index. The index is represented by the export (from 
“affected” to “origin”) to GDP ratio, exporti0 / GDPi, where i and o denote the affected country 
and the origin country, respectively. Figure 3-5 plots the index on the horizontal axis and the 
Contagion Coefficient on the vertical axis. There is a positive relationship between the income 
effect and the contagion. This correlation coefficient is 0.357. This result implies that countries 
with large export share to origin country are likely to suffer currency crisis. 
 
7.3 Cheaper Import Effect (bilateral trade effect, supply effect) 
        The third measure of trade channel is the Cheaper Import Effect (also called either bilateral 
trade effect or supply effect).  Depreciation of the first-hit currency drives export prices down, 
which is equivalent to the decline in import price in its trading partners. With nominal income 
and other conditions held constant in a trading partner country, a decline in its import price raises 
                                                  
26 See for example, Forbes (2000). 
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disposable income and, therefore, improves welfare of the country. It is also expected that the 
terms of trade in trade partner countries improve because the import price from the origin 
country decreases while the export price of these countries remains constant for the short-run.   
        In this case, in contrast to other two trade channel effects above, depreciation of the first-hit 
country may have positive effect on its trading partners. As shown in Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini 
and Tille (2000) and Forbes (2000), speculative pressures may not be transmitted to trading 
partners through the trading channel if the import price effect in trading partner countries 
dominates over the two previous measures. 
Table9   Figure 3-6 
        Table 9 presents the Cheaper Import Effect. The index is calculated as the import from the 
origin country divided by GDP. The larger the index, the larger the import from the origin 
country.  The contagion coefficient (CC) and the index are expected to be negatively correlated 
because the large devaluation in the origin country may improve its trading partners’ welfare in 
terms of the decline of import price, and therefore trading partners are less likely to suffer crisis.  
Figure 3-6 plots the CC and the index. It is obvious from the figure that the index has 
positively related to CC. The correlation coefficient is 0.384. This result means that the cheaper 
import effect does not work as to improve welfare of affected countries. Rather, the negative 
effect of depreciation in the origin country, especially the effect from weakened price 
competition, has been dominant across international trade.   
        All of the tests above have a consistent account. The correlation coefficients between trade 
link index and contagion coefficient are summarized in Table 10. As seen in this table, various 
measures support our high-frequency contagion and trade link channel.  
Table 10 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
        Using the daily data for the period of Asian Currency Crises, this paper examines 
high-frequency contagion among Asian six countries.   
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       By distinguishing the origin and affected countries in the causality relationship, we find 
evidence of statistically significant high-frequency contagion among Asian countries in both the 
exchange rate and the stock prices. The depreciation of Indonesia and of Korea has been found to 
have a significant high-frequency contagion effect on other currencies. We also find that the 
spillover effect in stock markets has been intensified after the crisis in most of the Asian 
countries.  
        Surprisingly, our high-frequency spillover effect is tied to the international trade channel. There 
is a positive relationship between the trade link indices and our contagion index. This implies that the 
bilateral trade linkage is an important variable in transmitting financial pressures across international 
borders. 
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Figure 1-1: Asia Exchange Rates 
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Figure 1-2: Asia Stock Price Index
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Figure 2-1 
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Figure 2-2 
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Figure 2-3 
Stock Price Contagion Coefficient (after Crisis) 1%           , 5%            , 10% 
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Figure 3-1
International Bank Lending to Asia (millions of USD)
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Figure 3-2
Common Creditor Index and Contagion coefficient
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Figure 3-3
Export share and Contagion coefficient
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Figure 3-4
Trade linkage and Contagion coefficient
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Figure 3-5
Income effect and Contagion coefficient
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Figure 3-6
Cheap import effect and Contagion coefficient
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Table 1-1
Weekly Origin (Friday to Friday change),  July 1997-January 19
devaluation 
Week Origin rate(%)
July-1 TH -10.11
July-2 PH -7.95
July-4 TH -5.75
August-3 ID -10.13
August-4 TH -4.52
August-5 ID -7.51
September-1 TH -9.40
September-3 PH -4.81
October-1 ID -13.84
October-5 TH -5.99
November-2 TH -4.94
November-3 KR -4.85
November-4 KR -8.13
December-1 ID -7.76
December-2 ID -32.93
January-1 KR -17.63
January-2 ID -18.32
January-4 ID -57.18
Notes : Authors' calculation.
Data source: Datastream
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Table 1-2
Daily Origin of Exchange Rate, July 1997-March 1999
devaluation devaluation devaluation
Origin rate(%) Origin rate(%) Origin rate(%)
1997 7 2 TH -3.40 1997 12 11 KR -8.02 1998 3 6 ID -4.24
1997 7 3 TH -2.22 1997 12 12 ID -10.97 1998 3 9 ID -2.40
1997 7 4 TH -2.06 1997 12 15 ID -6.72 1998 4 16 ID -2.23
1997 7 14 PH -5.30 1997 12 16 TH -3.66 1998 4 21 PH -2.49
1997 7 21 ID -2.83 1997 12 22 KR -10.12 1998 5 6 ID -6.12
1997 7 23 TH -2.06 1997 12 23 KR -10.12 1998 5 7 ID -4.99
1997 8 15 ID -2.99 1997 12 24 ID -4.32 1998 5 13 ID -10.37
1997 8 18 ID -3.23 1997 12 25 ID -2.34 1998 5 14 ID -3.24
1997 8 27 ID -2.93 1997 12 31 KR -3.96 1998 5 19 ID -12.50
1997 8 28 ID -3.19 1998 1 2 ID -14.38 1998 5 28 ID -5.17
1997 9 2 ID -2.39 1998 1 5 ID -13.08 1998 6 10 ID -5.08
1997 9 3 TH -2.81 1998 1 6 ID -11.93 1998 6 11 ID -4.66
1997 9 4 TH -3.74 1998 1 7 ID -7.57 1998 6 12 ID -4.02
1997 9 18 PH -2.06 1998 1 8 ID -18.31 1998 6 15 ID -4.48
1997 9 29 ID -2.38 1998 1 12 TH -2.39 1998 6 16 ID -4.32
1997 9 30 ID -2.33 1998 1 16 ID -4.01 1998 6 17 ID -6.82
1997 10 1 ID -3.19 1998 1 19 ID -7.87 1998 6 29 MY -2.01
1997 10 3 ID -4.32 1998 1 20 ID -4.72 1998 8 6 KR -3.21
1997 10 6 ID -2.56 1998 1 21 ID -11.10 1998 8 11 ID -2.27
1997 10 20 TW -2.45 1998 1 22 ID -12.87 1998 9 8 ID -3.44
1997 11 20 KR -5.52 1998 1 23 ID -12.77 1998 9 9 ID -2.22
1997 11 25 KR -2.24 1998 1 26 ID -3.85 1998 10 27 ID -2.08
1997 11 28 KR -2.92 1998 2 12 MY -3.04 1998 11 2 ID -2.74
1997 12 1 KR -2.21 1998 2 13 ID -9.30 1998 11 3 ID -4.26
1997 12 2 KR -2.82 1998 2 16 ID -3.99 1998 11 4 ID -3.98
1997 12 3 TH -3.66 1998 2 17 KR -2.17 1998 12 15 ID -2.29
1997 12 8 KR -5.39 1998 2 23 ID -2.62 1998 1 13 ID -3.84
1997 12 9 KR -6.88 1998 3 4 ID -3.31 1999 1 14 ID -2.08
1997 12 10 KR -6.73 1998 3 5 ID -6.84 1999 3 11 ID -2.17
Notes : Authors' calculation.
Data source: Datastream
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Table 1-3
Daily Origin of Stock Price, January 1994-June 1999 
devaluation devaluation devaluation
origin rate(%) origin rate(%) origin rate(%)
1994 1 11 ml -3.38 1997 8 29 id -4.75 1998 5 6 id -3.26
1994 1 12 ml -5.07 1997 9 2 tw -2.46 1998 5 11 kr -2.10
1994 1 13 ml -4.25 1997 9 3 ml -3.42 1998 5 12 kr -2.52
1994 1 14 tw -2.39 1997 9 4 ml -2.92 1998 5 13 id -3.24
1994 1 18 th -2.15 1997 9 12 id -2.11 1998 5 14 th -2.18
1994 1 20 th -2.18 1997 9 18 ml -2.17 1998 5 18 id -2.38
1994 1 25 ml -2.64 1997 9 22 ml -2.32 1998 5 20 th -2.59
1994 2 7 th -3.86 1997 9 23 kr -2.00 1998 5 25 kr -3.73
1994 2 14 tw -2.22 1997 10 3 id -2.26 1998 5 26 kr -4.84
1994 2 28 tw -2.47 1997 10 8 kr -2.04 1998 5 29 th -2.01
1994 3 1 ph -2.75 1997 10 16 kr -2.56 1998 6 1 tw -2.66
1994 3 2 ph -2.42 1997 10 17 tw -2.11 1998 6 2 th -3.00
1994 3 4 ph -2.39 1997 10 20 tw -4.36 1998 6 11 ph -2.52
1994 3 9 ph -2.61 1997 10 24 ml -2.59 1998 6 12 kr -4.31
1994 3 22 id -2.02 1997 10 27 kr -4.46 1998 6 15 kr -4.55
1994 10 6 tw -2.85 1997 10 29 th -3.54 1998 6 16 kr -3.78
1994 10 11 tw -4.27 1997 10 30 kr -3.17 1998 7 10 ml -2.97
1994 11 1 tw -3.17 1997 10 31 kr -3.11 1998 7 13 ml -2.38
1994 11 23 th -3.43 1997 11 7 kr -2.31 1998 7 22 ml -2.07
1995 1 12 th -2.12 1997 11 11 id -2.29 1998 7 23 kr -2.39
1995 1 13 ph -3.19 1997 11 17 kr -2.23 1998 7 29 ml -2.84
1995 1 23 th -2.89 1997 11 18 ml -3.90 1998 8 4 ph -2.13
1995 2 27 ph -2.08 1997 11 19 ml -3.44 1998 8 5 id -3.06
1995 4 17 tw -2.31 1997 11 20 ml -7.23 1998 8 6 id -2.42
1995 7 19 tw -2.53 1997 11 21 id -2.27 1998 8 10 ml -2.47
1995 7 20 tw -2.62 1997 11 24 kr -4.85 1998 8 11 ml -3.92
1995 8 9 tw -2.26 1997 11 25 kr -3.59 1998 8 12 ph -3.85
1995 8 11 tw -2.74 1997 11 26 ml -2.88 1998 8 13 ml -2.72
1995 11 20 ph -2.04 1997 11 28 kr -3.63 1998 8 17 ml -2.45
1995 12 14 kr -2.12 1997 12 1 kr -3.82 1998 8 18 kr -2.08
1995 12 18 kr -2.32 1997 12 2 kr -3.91 1998 8 21 ml -2.43
1996 1 5 tw -3.43 1997 12 9 kr -3.00 1998 8 24 id -3.31
1996 1 29 tw -2.70 1997 12 12 kr -5.24 1998 8 25 id -2.02
1996 5 20 tw -2.39 1997 12 15 id -6.21 1998 8 27 ml -2.01
1996 7 29 id -2.31 1997 12 16 ml -2.68 1998 8 28 ph -3.75
1996 10 4 th -2.05 1997 12 23 kr -4.23 1998 9 10 ph -3.17
1996 10 8 th -4.19 1997 12 24 kr -4.26 1998 9 11 ph -2.24
1996 10 28 ph -2.63 1997 12 25 kr -2.29 1998 9 15 id -4.88
1997 1 7 kr -2.24 1998 1 5 ml -2.86 1998 9 17 id -2.28
1997 2 4 th -3.43 1998 1 6 ml -3.44 1998 9 18 id -3.56
1997 2 14 th -2.15 1998 1 8 ph -3.96 1998 9 21 id -4.75
1997 3 4 th -2.28 1998 1 9 ph -6.21 1998 9 22 ph -2.22
1997 3 7 th -4.56 1998 1 22 ph -3.08 1998 10 2 tw -2.64
1997 3 24 tw -2.41 1998 2 5 th -2.19 1998 10 27 kr -2.30
1997 4 8 ph -2.24 1998 2 11 id -3.41 1998 11 9 ph -2.30
1997 4 29 ph -2.62 1998 2 12 id -6.18 1998 11 10 ph -3.26
1997 4 30 ph -2.49 1998 2 13 id -2.60 1998 11 11 th -3.62
1997 5 15 th -2.54 1998 2 16 kr -3.77 1998 11 13 th -2.69
1997 5 16 th -2.46 1998 2 17 kr -2.49 1998 11 25 id -2.96
1997 5 19 ph -2.08 1998 3 5 kr -2.66 1998 12 3 th -2.82
1997 7 9 ph -2.56 1998 3 6 kr -2.55 1998 12 4 th -2.18
1997 7 10 ph -2.74 1998 3 9 kr -2.86 1998 12 17 kr -2.66
1997 8 5 ml -2.55 1998 3 30 kr -2.21 1999 1 5 tw -2.13
1997 8 7 id -2.16 1998 4 1 kr -2.00 1999 1 26 th -2.37
1997 8 15 id -2.76 1998 4 2 kr -2.49 1999 2 8 ml -3.78
1997 8 18 id -2.74 1998 4 3 kr -3.50 1999 2 9 kr -2.45
1997 8 20 id -2.09 1998 4 16 ml -2.07 1999 2 10 th -2.07
1997 8 22 id -2.18 1998 4 23 kr -2.43 1999 2 19 kr -2.02
1997 8 25 id -3.81 1998 4 29 id -2.35 1999 5 13 kr -2.73
1997 8 26 th -3.99 1998 5 1 id -2.12 1999 5 17 kr -2.32
1997 8 27 th -2.33 1998 5 4 kr -3.20 1999 5 26 th -2.59
1997 8 28 ph -5.40 1998 5 5 id -2.00
Notes : Authors' calculation.
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Table 2
News and Events  (Daily Origin of Exchange Rate) July 1997-June 1999
Origin News
1997 7 2 TH Devaluing baht. 
1997 7 3 TH Thai credit agency downgrades most ratings on devaluation. IMF welcomes Thai baht float.
1997 7 4 TH Thai central bank sets baht-dollar reference rate at 28.189.
1997 7 14 PH Philippine bankers group lifts volatility band on peso trading.
1997 7 21 ID Indonesian Minister of Finance says Indonesia won't change Rupiah's managed float.
1997 7 23 TH Thai finance minister says no need for financial aid from Japan and IMF.
1997 8 15 ID Indonesian central bank called an emergency meeting with country's largest banks.
1997 8 18 ID Bank Indonesia raises SBI interest rate.
1997 8 27 ID Many indonesian not making new loans because fear of high interest rate.
1997 8 28 ID Suharto worried high interest rates hurt economy.
1997 9 2 ID Inflation rate rises to 5.7%, eight-month high.
1997 9 3 TH Tahi won't seek increase in IMF package.
1997 9 4 TH Thai finance minister syas Government won't intervene in market.
1997 9 18 PH The EYCO group of companies, Appliance Maker, to stop debt payments.
1997 9 29 ID S&P degrades Malaysia, and will degrade Indonesia.
1997 10 1 ID Tradeand industry minister said Rupiah decline won't boost exports.
1997 10 3 ID Bank Indonesia to provide Swaps facilities for exporters.
1997 10 6 ID Suharto calls emergency meeting with top economic ministers.
1997 10 20 TW Taiwan authority won't support Taiwaniese dollar.
1997 11 20 KR South Korean finance minister to resign due to a failure in the passage of financial reform bills.
1997 11 25 KR Korea asks IMF for standby credit, Finance minister says.
1997 11 28 KR Korean Oct. CA deficit widened to $680.6 mln from $498.4 mln.
1997 12 1 KR Korea and IMF at odds over bailout.
1997 12 2 KR Korean stocks fell for a ninth day as the abrupt closure of 9 merchant banks.
1997 12 3 ID Indonesia may be headed for double-digit inflation this year.
1997 12 9 KR Korea may shut down 2 commercial banks as part of IMF bailout.
1997 12 16 TH Thai currency reserves may be halved. 
1997 12 22 KR Korean Crisis deepens as Moody's Cuts rating.
1997 12 23 KR Korea debt payment's delay mulled by foreign banks.
1997 12 24 ID Indonesia's foreign debt payment may reach 323 trillion rupiah.
1997 12 31 KR Korea's Total external debt estimated at $156.9 bln, up $41 bln.
1998 1 2 ID Indonesian State Banks to Merge.
1998 1 5 ID Indonesia to increase generic Drug prices 15% in April.
1998 1 6 ID Indonesia's December inflation seen rising 2% from November.
1998 1 7 ID Indonesia sees inflation of 9% in fiscal 1998-1999.
1998 1 8 ID US official Rubin says Indonesia must do more to meet IMF goals.
1998 1 12 TH Thai Govt to brief Creditors of closed 56 insolvent finance firms .    
1998 1 16 ID Suharto's promises to revise the budget fail to impress.  
1998 1 19 ID Indonesia reserves fall 8.2% to $20.38 bln in month to Jan.15.
1998 1 20 ID Bank International INdonesia's credit rating may be cut by S&P.
1998 1 21 ID Indonesia state ratings company cut ratings on 17 companies.
1998 1 23 ID Indonesia's Budget Plan for 1998 revised.
1998 1 26 ID Moody's raises specter of indonesia corporate debt moratorium.
Source: Bloomberg
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Table 2(continued)
News and Events  (Daily Origin) July 1997-June, 1999
Origin News
1998 2 12 MY Foreign reserve in January down.
1998 2 13 ID Rubin Concerned Over Pegging Rupiah to Dollar.
1998 2 16 ID Camdessus Says It's Too Soon for Indonesian Currency Peg.
1998 2 17 KR Korea accepts Labor Law revisions.
1998 3 4 ID GS prospects the Pegging Rupiah to Dollar.
1998 3 5 ID IMF Officials Say Indonesia Aid Payment Likely to Be Postponed.
1998 3 6 ID Indonesia's Finance Minister Warns of Consequences if IMF Aid Withheld.
1998 3 9 ID IMF Says Indonesia Won't Receive Next Loan Before April.
1998 4 16 ID Indonesia's Suharto Pledges to Adhere to Reforms.
1998 4 21 PH Philippines Polls Tainted By Fears of Fraud.
1998 5 6 ID Indonesian Fuel Prices to Rise Tomorrow.
1998 5 7 ID Palm Oil Rises to Record High on Weak Ringgit, Likely Shortage.
1998 5 13 ID Students burn effigies of President Suharto in the capital and surging prices trigger riots.
1998 5 14 ID Thousands Protest Indonesia University Killings, a second day of violence in Jakarta.
1998 5 19 ID House of Representatives calls for the resignation of President Suharto.
1998 5 28 ID President Suharto and IMF did not reach agreement on conditions for IMF support.
1998 6 10 ID IMF official arrive in Jakarta for review of economic targets under the IMF loan disbursement plan.
1998 6 11 ID  Indonesian Banks Cut Deposit Rates Yesterday.
1998 6 12 ID Indonesian Army Parliamentary Seats to Be Cut.
1998 6 16 ID IMF Sees Indonesian Deficit of More Than 4% of GDP.
1998 6 17 ID Indonesian Banks' Bad Loans Surged to 25% at End April.
1998 6 29 MY Malaysia Plans New Ways to Plug Ringgit Outflow.
1998 8 6 KR Korea's Big Five Cheabols need debt payment amount to 28billion of USD.
1998 8 11 ID Indonesia Refutes Report That it Failed to Make Debt Paymen.
1998 9 8 ID Students descended on House of Representatives calling for resignation of President B.J. Habibie.
1998 9 9 ID Indonesian Military Breaks Up Student Protest With Tear Gas.
1998 10 27 ID Indonesia Mulling Return to Currency Band System.
1998 11 2 ID Indonesia August Trade Surplus Narrows to $1.85 Billion.
1998 11 3 ID Indonesian Companies Unlikely to Get Large Debt Write-offs.
1998 11 4 ID Indonesian Panel Says Security Agents Linked to Riots in May.
1998 12 15 ID Indonesia Sees Tourism Revenues about half of targeting.
1999 1 13 ID Indonesia Unveils Law to Narrow Central Bank's Role.
1999 3 11 ID Indonesia Mulls Merger Of five of the largest private banks.
Source: Bloomberg
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Table 3-1 CC(t,i) of Exchange Rate
1997:1-1999:7
Origin Affected
(nob) Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
ID (July-Dec 1997) (16) 0.056 0.290*** 0.193** 0.012 0.303***
t-stat 1.138 4.685 2.858 1.155 6.349
ID (Oct-Dec 1997) (8) 0.094 0.256* 0.249* 0.036* 0.332***
t-stat 1.025 2.079 1.868 1.873 3.508
ID (Jan-June 1998) (32) 0.061** 0.121** 0.090*** 0.023** 0.069***
t-stat 2.119 2.576 3.244 2.083 2.938
ID (after July 1998) (12) 0.063* 0.004 -0.079 -0.023 0.038
t-stat 2.158 0.178 -1.527 -1.330 0.945
KR(14) 0.193 0.124** 0.066** 0.016 0.215***
t-stat 1.067 2.643 2.283 0.795 3.593
ML(2) 0.012 0.181 0.233 0.041** 0.418
t-stat 0.024 1.032 1.552 5.490 2.388
PH(3) -0.089 -0.027 0.186 -0.006 0.173
t-stat -0.598 -0.535 1.083 -0.480 1.609
TH(7) 0.183 -0.322 0.064 0.085 0.057
t-stat 1.241 -1.080 0.396 0.461 1.329
TW(1) 0.286 0.218 0.770 0.047 0.552
t-stat - - - - -
Note:  Values tabulated are Contagion coefficients and t-statistics, calculated under 
the null hypothesis of cc equals zero; there exists no significant high frequency contagion 
from the origin to affected country. 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3-2 CC(t,i) of Stock Price
Full sample(1994:1-1999:7)
Origin Affected
(nob) Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
ID(30) 0.170** 0.276*** 0.078 0.066 0.187***
t-stat 2.526 3.790 0.687 1.473 2.813
KR(47) 0.011 0.215*** 0.114** 0.031 0.286***
t-stat 0.192 3.731 2.378 0.781 6.181
ML(29) 0.227*** 0.049 0.276*** 0.139*** 0.153**
t-stat 2.929 0.472 3.752 2.943 2.118
PH(27) 0.266** 0.171 0.188* 0.076 -0.067
t-stat 2.543 1.503 2.009 1.310 -0.490
TW(22) 0.074 0.086 0.112 0.124* 0.153*
t-stat 1.001 0.874 1.273 1.901 1.885
TH(33) 0.132** 0.027 0.062 0.205*** 0.044
t-stat 2.204 0.340 0.645 2.850 0.736
Note:  Values tabulated are Contagion coefficients and t-statistics, calculated under 
the null hypothesis of cc equals zero; there exists no significant high frequency contagion 
from the origin to affected country. 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3-3 CC(t,i) of Stock Price
Before Crises (1994:1-1997:6)
Origin Affected
(nob) Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
ID(2) 0.409*** 0.302 0.556** -0.100 0.182
stat 40.146 1.678 6.543 -0.995 0.685
KR(3) -0.068 -0.104 -0.086* -0.283 0.127
stat -0.343 -0.790 -2.549 -2.196 1.275
ML(4) 0.265** -0.123 0.359* 0.318 0.254
stat 3.680 -0.532 2.628 1.974 1.280
PH(12) 0.251*** 0.095 0.188** 0.122 0.261**
stat 4.123 0.440 2.321 1.178 2.813
TW(16) 0.013 0.140 -0.025 0.074 0.136
stat 0.289 1.288 -0.267 1.291 1.439
TH(17) 0.155** 0.028 0.226** 0.122 0.040
stat 2.267 0.341 2.535 1.137 0.532
Note:  Values tabulated are Contagion coefficients and t-statistics, calculated under 
the null hypothesis of cc equals zero; there exists no significant high frequency contagion 
from the origin to affected country. 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3-4 CC(t,i) of Stock Price
After Crises (1997:7-1999:7)
Origin Affected
(nob) Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
ID(28) 0.153** 0.274*** 0.044 0.077 0.187**
stat 2.152 3.534 0.367 1.660 2.676
KR(44) 0.017 0.237*** 0.128** 0.053 0.297***
stat 0.271 3.963 2.525 1.313 6.094
ML(25) 0.222** 0.076 0.263*** 0.111** 0.136*
stat 2.469 0.642 3.165 2.326 1.738
PH(15) 0.278*** 0.232** 0.187** 0.039 -0.329*
stat 5.127 2.352 2.301 0.434 -1.948
TW(6) 0.238 -0.058 0.478 0.256 0.199
stat 1.605 -0.409 1.263 1.901 1.263
TH(16) 0.109 0.026 -0.113 0.293*** 0.049
stat 1.060 0.185 -0.689 3.144 0.502
Note:  Values tabulated are Contagion coefficients and t-statistics, calculated under 
the null hypothesis of cc equals zero; there exists no significant high frequency contagion 
from the origin to affected country. 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 4 Results of Dynamic OLS: Exchange Rate
Panel A:  all(pooled) origin
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.274 0.120 0.155 0.198 0.079 0.144
replaced s.e 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.010 0.589 0.009
replaced t -26.669 7.452 13.963 18.840 0.133 16.138
Panel B: Indonesia origin
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.113 0.028 0.044 0.020 0.017
replaced s.e. 0.063 0.016 0.015 0.002 0.010
replaced t -1.790 1.745 2.994 9.923 1.635
Panel C: Korea origin
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.675 0.250 0.236 -0.027 -1.443
replaced s.e 0.326 0.046 0.363 0.499 0.227
replaced t 2.075 5.471 0.650 -0.055 -6.365
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Table 5-1 Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: all(pooled) origin,   full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.493 -0.053 0.650 0.425 0.076 0.253
replaced s.e 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.010
replaced t 57.505 -4.881 80.386 63.582 22.379 24.698
Panel B: all(pooled) origin,  pre-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.065 -0.209 -0.164 0.535 0.314 -0.119
replaced s.e 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.023 0.017 0.025
replaced t 6.039 -18.192 -13.920 23.532 18.246 -4.850
Panel C: all(pooled) origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.525 -0.058 0.685 0.387 0.025 0.271
replaced s.e 0.019 0.025 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.015
replaced t 27.510 -2.277 42.209 40.076 5.604 17.767
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Table 5-2 Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: Indonesia origin,  full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.041 1.713 0.680 -0.339 -0.502
replaced s.e. 0.041 0.117 0.539 0.184 0.652
replaced t -1.006 14.617 1.261 -1.848 -0.770
Panel B: Indonesia origin,  pre-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient
replaced s.e.
replaced t
Panel C: Indonesia origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.043 1.782 0.758 -0.386 -0.624
replaced s.e. 0.041 0.117 0.539 0.183 0.650
replaced t 1.041 15.229 1.407 -2.106 -0.959
Note:  Estimation for pre-crisis period is excluded due to the lack of d.f.
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Table 5-3 Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: Korea origin,  full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.244 -0.831 -4.317 -0.229 1.656
replaced s.e 0.681 0.121 0.611 0.117 0.776
replaced t -0.359 -6.849 -7.067 -1.946 2.135
Panel B: Korea origin,  pre-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient
replaced s.e.
replaced t
Panel C: Korea origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.244 -0.831 -4.317 -0.229 1.656
replaced s.e 0.681 0.121 0.611 0.117 0.776
replaced t -0.359 -6.849 -7.067 -1.946 2.135
Note:  Estimation for pre-crisis period is excluded due to the lack of d.f.
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Table 5-4  Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: Malaysia origin,   full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -1.629 -0.422 -0.291 -0.726 1.046
replaced s.e 0.986 0.193 0.817 0.136 0.600
replaced t -1.652 -2.180 -0.356 -5.354 1.743
Panel B: Malaysia origin,  pre-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient
replaced s.e.
replaced t
Panel C: Malaysia origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.951 -0.365 -1.779 -1.248 1.264
replaced s.e 0.966 0.227 0.634 0.155 0.734
replaced t -0.985 -1.606 -2.804 -8.075 1.722
Note:  Estimation for pre-crisis period is excluded due to the lack of d.f.
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Table 5-5  Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: Philippines origin,  full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.474 0.660 1.734 0.545 0.136
replaced s.e 1.115 0.079 0.225 0.141 0.845
replaced t 0.425 8.344 7.712 3.853 0.161
Panel B: Philippines origin,  pre-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 5.298 2.373 4.152 0.060 -3.358
replaced s.e 2.818 0.033 1.920 0.325 11.466
replaced t 1.880 72.174 2.163 0.184 -0.293
Panel C: Philippines origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.847 0.561 2.292 0.695 0.165
replaced s.e 0.230 0.258 0.294 0.498 0.950
replaced t 3.680 2.174 7.808 1.397 0.173
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Table 5-6 Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: Taiwan origin,  full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 7.701 -0.073 0.958 -0.570 2.802
replaced s.e 1.585 0.024 0.088 0.435 1.269
replaced t 4.859 -2.982 10.829 -1.309 2.207
Panel B: Taiwan origin,  pre-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 12.597 1.273 2.630 -4.544 8.136
replaced s.e 0.344 0.042 0.093 0.598 2.882
replaced t 36.589 30.346 28.214 -7.601 2.823
Panel C: Taiwan origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient
replaced s.e.
replaced t
Note:  Estimation for post-crisis period is excluded due to the lack of d.f.
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Table 5-7 Results of Dynamic OLS: Stock Price
Panel A: Thailand origin,  full sample
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -0.638 0.839 1.873 0.940 1.313
replaced s.e 0.726 0.041 0.099 0.589 0.145
replaced t -0.878 20.354 18.881 1.595 9.073
Panel B: Thailand origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient -3.063 1.294 2.508 -0.954 0.991
replaced s.e 1.764 0.083 0.471 0.367 0.058
replaced t -1.736 15.528 5.323 -2.598 17.207
Panel C: Thailand origin,  post-crisis period
Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Thailand
coefficient 0.054 0.567 -0.044 -2.513 -1.246
replaced s.e 2.794 0.126 0.150 0.878 0.425
replaced t 0.019 4.489 -0.294 -2.863 -2.929
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Table 6
Export share as a percent of total exports in millions of US dollars.
1996-1999 average
Country Destination of Exports
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Indonesia 6.442 2.707 1.437 1.805
Korea 3.457 2.950 1.927 1.501
Malaysia 1.487 2.868 1.443 3.541
Philippines 0.525 2.031 3.466 2.930
Thailand 1.958 1.641 3.775 1.365
Notes : Authors' calculation.
Data source: IMF, Direction of Trade (2000).
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Table 7
Direct Trade Linkage Index 
1996-1999 average
Country Countries export to and import from
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Indonesia 1.090 1.070 1.668 0.906
Korea 0.910 1.278 1.647 0.714
Malaysia 0.930 0.722 1.095 1.132
Philippines 0.332 0.353 0.905 1.007
Thailand 1.094 0.634 0.868 0.993
Notes : Authors' calculation.
Data source: IMF, Direction of Trade (2000).
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Table 8
Imcome Effect  (GDP share, %)
1996-1999 average
Origin Affected countries
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Indonesia 0.06342 0.00014 0.01970 0.08137
Korea 0.20849 0.00026 0.07765 0.06625
Malaysia 0.09224 0.09426 0.13227 0.15453
Philippines 0.04789 0.06429 0.00013 0.05745
Thailand 0.06157 0.04659 0.00032 0.10137
Notes : Authors' calculation.
Data source: IMF, Direction of Trade (2000).
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Table 9
Cheap Import effect
1996-1999 average
Origin Countries import from
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Indonesia 0.08861 0.00018 0.09567 0.06970
Korea 0.1434 0.00043 0.29620 0.14523
Malaysia 0.0597 0.06680 0.12437 0.20178
Philippines 0.0066 0.01926 0.00014 0.04733
Thailand 0.0683 0.02510 0.00030 0.10302
Notes : Authors' calculation.
Data source: IMF, Direction of Trade (2000).
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Table 10
Correlation Coefficients between Trade Link Index and Contagion coefficient 
Trade Index
Export Share 0.329
DTLI 0.258
 Income Effect 0.357
Cheap Import Effect 0.384
